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We evaluate the short-horizon predictive ability of finan-
cial conditions indexes for stock returns and macroeconomic
variables. We find reliable predictability only when the sample
includes the 2008 financial crisis, and we argue that this result
is driven by tailoring the indexes to the crisis and by non-
synchronous trading. In addition, we suggest a simple proce-
dure for aggregating the various indexes into a single proxy for
financial conditions, which can help to reduce the uncertainty
faced by policymakers when monitoring financial conditions.
JEL Codes: E32, G01, G17.
1. Introduction
The severity and the economic impact of the 2008 financial crisis
have led to a proliferation of indexes that proxy for financial con-
ditions or financial stress, which we collectively refer to as finan-
cial conditions indexes (FCIs). An open question in the literature is
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whether these indexes should be used as indicators of current finan-
cial conditions, or whether they also have predictive power for future
financial and economic activity and could be used as early-warning
indicators. In this paper we evaluate whether FCIs can predict stock
returns or innovations to macroeconomic variables over a one-month
or a one-quarter horizon. In addition, we study the Granger causality
relation between the FCIs and several measures of credit availability
that we use as proxies for the “financial cycle” (Borio 2014). Finally,
we suggest a simple procedure for aggregating the various FCIs into
a single proxy for financial conditions.
We find that most FCIs can predict monthly and quarterly
returns on the S&P 500 and on a portfolio of financial companies and
also innovations to a number of macroeconomic variables. However,
this predictability is not robust to excluding the period around the
2008 financial crisis (2007–12). We posit three possible explanations
for this pattern. The first is threshold effects, in the sense that finan-
cial conditions may matter only after deteriorating beyond a certain
threshold. The second is data mining, because most of the FCIs were
introduced after the financial crisis, and they are built using variables
that displayed significant movements during the crisis. And the third
is non-synchronous data, given that most FCIs include one variable
derived from the prices of options that trade after equity markets
close, hence FCIs include, by construction, information that will
be incorporated in stock prices the next day. We provide evidence
that all three effects are present, but we argue that predictability is
mainly driven by data mining and by non-synchronous trading.
The FCIs we study measure financial conditions in one of two
ways. The first approach is to evaluate whether broad financial con-
ditions are loose or tight by historical standards (e.g., the Bloomberg
and Chicago Fed indexes). Alternatively, other indexes purport to
measure whether the financial system is experiencing historically
unusual stress (e.g., the Carlson, Lewis, and Nelson 2014 index).
Despite these and other methodological differences that we detail in
section 2, the FCIs exhibit a large amount of common variation, as
can be seen in the top graph in figure 1. Such a result is expected
because, while the concept of “financial conditions” is often only
loosely defined by the articles that build the various FCIs, changes
in the state of the financial system directly affect many of the vari-
ables used to build the FCIs. However, the top graph in figure 1
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Figure 1. Time-Series Plots of the Twelve Financial
Conditions Indexes
Notes: The graphs show the time series of the twelve FCIs we study. For scale
reasons, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) U.S. Financial Stress Index and
the Carlson, Lewis, and Nelson (2014) Financial Stress Index are not shown. The
bottom graph focuses on the years surrounding the 2008 financial crisis, and it
shows the averages of standardized versions of (i) Citi FCI and IMF FCI, (ii)
MS FCI and ANFCI, and (iii) the remaining FCIs. See table 1 for a list of FCI
acronyms.
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shows that, at certain points in time, different indexes provide a
conflicting reading of financial conditions. This was the case, for
instance, in 1997–98 for the Citi FCI and 2004–05 for one of the
Bloomberg FCIs. In section 3, we propose a method to extract a
single and more precise measure of financial conditions from the set
of indexes we consider.
Having a reliable measure of financial conditions is important
for policymakers because, as the literature has shown, financial
conditions matter in a variety of ways. The importance of a well-
functioning financial system to the broad economy is highlighted
by the results in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap, Stein,
and Wilcox (1993), Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), Peek and
Rosengren (1997), and Paravisini (2008), who show that tight mon-
etary policy, binding capital ratios, and bank financing constraints
can reduce the supply of credit, especially in the case of small banks
with less liquid assets (Kashyap and Stein 2000). A reduced credit
supply has particularly negative effects for small firms (Gertler and
Gilchrist 1994, Khwaja and Mian 2008) and bank-dependent bor-
rowers (Chava and Purnanandam 2011). A tight credit supply ulti-
mately affects investment (Campello, Graham, and Harvey 2010),
inventories (Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein 1994), and the broader
economy (Bernanke 1983; Peek and Rosengren 1997, 2000; Calomiris
and Mason 2003).
We assess predictability using simple predictive regressions of a
set of stock returns or innovations to macroeconomic variables on
lagged FCI values. Our analysis differs from Hatzius et al. (2010),
who also evaluate the predictive power of several FCIs, in a few
important ways. First, we only consider FCIs that are updated at
least monthly (we should emphasize that, as shown in figure 1, the
FCIs still have meaningful monthly variation), and we study their
predictive power for stock returns and innovations to macroeconomic
variables one month and one quarter ahead. By using such horizons,
our predictability results are unlikely to reflect business-cycle effects,
especially in the case of one-month-ahead regressions. Second, we
study a larger number of FCIs and a larger number of financial and
macroeconomic variables. Third, we explicitly discuss whether the
predictability that arises in coincidence with the 2008 financial crisis
is hard-wired in the FCIs, in the sense that the variables included
in the FCIs may have been chosen on the basis of whether they
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experienced large fluctuations in 2007 and 2008.1 Finally, as
described in more detail in section 2, we assess the statistical signif-
icance of predictability with a methodology that is robust to biases
generated by the high persistence that typically characterizes FCIs,
which we found had noticeable effects on the results discussed in
section 2.
Our conclusions differ from those of English, Tsatsaronis, and
Zoli (2005), who focus on four- and eight-quarter horizons, and con-
sider a longer sample than we do. They aggregate financial variables
with principal component analysis and find that the resulting proxies
for financial conditions have some predictive power for macroeco-
nomic variables. Our conclusions, however, are more in line with
those of Hatzius et al. (2010), because we find limited value in using
FCIs as reliable early-warning indicators, especially when (i) exclud-
ing the period surrounding the 2008 financial crisis from the sample,
and (ii) acknowledging that the choice of the variables that enter
many FCIs may have been influenced by knowing, in hindsight, what
precipitated the financial crisis.
In the second part of our paper, we discuss a simple two-step
methodology for combining the various FCIs into a single proxy for
financial conditions. The large number of FCIs is itself indicative of
the uncertainty that surrounds the measurement of financial con-
ditions. In the top graph in figure 1, one can see that the FCIs
generally move together in the long run, but they can provide con-
flicting assessments at a given point in time—even shortly before
a major financial crisis. For instance, the bottom graph in figure
1 shows the averages of three sets of (standardized) FCIs between
2006 and 2009. The shaded area highlights the period between March
and August 2008, which corresponds to the months between the pur-
chase of The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. by JPMorgan Chase &
Co. (March 16, 2008) and the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. on September 15, 2008. The chart clearly shows that
1For example, Hatzius et al. (2010) develop their own FCI in addition to eval-
uating others. They note on page 21 that “the better performance during the
most recent five years . . . may reflect selection bias in our choice of variables to
include in the index: naturally, our selection was governed in part by an under-
standing of the types of financial variables that were used for monitoring and
measuring the recent financial crisis. In this sense, we did not seek to mitigate
observer bias.”
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different FCIs give conflicting readings of the state of the financial
system in the second and third quarters of 2008, ranging from a
noticeable deterioration to a large improvement.
Aggregating the individual indexes can help average out model
uncertainty and provide policymakers with a single variable that
reflects the information available in all of the FCIs. We first identify
the indexes that best summarize the information provided by the
remaining FCIs. In the second step we form all combinations of the
identified indexes and select the “best” combination on the basis of
how well it summarizes the information in the remaining FCIs. This
procedure is discussed in detail in section 3.
2. Assessing the Predictive Ability of FCIs
We consider twelve FCIs that (i) focus on the United States, (ii)
are updated at least every month, and (iii) have a sufficiently long
history.2 Table 1 contains a detailed list of data sources and includes
the abbreviated FCI names we use in the paper.
The construction of the FCIs varies considerably, although all
of them are largely based on financial market variables, including
implied volatilities, Treasury yields, yield spreads, commercial paper
rates, stock returns, and exchange rates (see Kliesen, Owyang, and
Vermann 2012 for a detailed list of variables that underlie a range of
the FCIs we study here). Some FCIs only include a small set of vari-
ables, as in the case of the Bloomberg Financial Conditions Index,
which is based on ten underlying variables. One index, the Chicago
Fed Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index, has more than
100 underlying variables.
In general, the constituent variables are aggregated using prin-
cipal component analysis or simple weighted sums. Principal com-
ponent analysis is used extensively in the literature to extract infor-
mation from a large set of macroeconomic or financial variables for
forecasting purposes. For example, Ludvigson and Ng (2007) rely
2In order to increase the power of our test, we require that the FCIs cover
the stressful episodes that characterized the late 1990s (the Long-Term Capi-
tal Management collapse, and the Asian and Russian financial crises). For this
reason, we do not include the HSBC Financial Clog Index (Bloomberg ticker
HSCLOG Index) or the Westpac U.S. Financial Stress Index (Bloomberg ticker
WRAISTRS Index), whose series start in 2007 and 1998, respectively.
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on dynamic factor analysis to summarize a broad cross-section of
variables, and find that several of the resulting factors can predict
one-quarter-ahead excess stock returns. Stock and Watson (2002)
use principal component analysis to build factors used to predict
several macroeconomic variables in the medium run (six, twelve,
and twenty-four months ahead).
For indexes constructed as weighted sums, weights are typically
assigned subjectively by the authors, although a few of the indexes
use more sophisticated methods. The Cleveland Financial Stress
Index (CFSI), for instance, calculates weights dynamically based
on the relative dollar flow observed in the Federal Reserve Board’s
Flow of Funds statistical release (Z.1) (Oet et al. 2011). All the
indexes are expressed in terms of z-scores, with the exception of the
Financial Stress Index of Carlson, Lewis, and Nelson (2014), which
is expressed in terms of probabilities.
2.1 Predictive Regressions
We evaluate the predictive power of the twelve FCIs with a series of
monthly and quarterly predictive regressions of the form
yt = α + β × FCIt−1 + t.
The FCIs enter the regression in levels, rather than changes,
because the developers of most of the FCIs emphasize that their
indexes are ordinal measures of financial conditions/stress.
We focus on one-month-ahead and one-quarter-ahead regressions
because our predictability results might in part reflect business-cycle
effects if the dependent variable were measured over longer hori-
zons. In particular, many FCIs include the implied volatility index
VIX as a constituent variable. Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009)
find that the variance risk premium, which is the difference between
the squared value of VIX and a measure of realized variance, can
predict stock returns about three to six months out, with the asso-
ciated adjusted R2 peaking at a five-month horizon and declining
gradually at longer horizons. The variance risk premium is driven
by the dynamics of both volatility risk and risk aversion; the latter
is embedded in VIX, and its evolution over time has a business-cycle
component. Note that we do not control for the predictive power of
other variables, like the variance risk premium, because the results
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from regressions in which FCIs are the only predictor already suggest
a lack of reliable predictive power at the horizons we focus on.
The FCI coefficient is estimated with OLS, and we assess its
statistical significance with either heteroskedasticity-consistent stan-
dard errors or the local-to-unity asymptotics procedure of Campbell
and Yogo (2006). Local-to-unity asymptotics are useful in evaluating
the statistical significance of persistent predictors, because, in such
cases, the standard t-test can give a rejection rate that is inconsistent
with its nominal size.
As is clear from the time-series plots in figure 1, FCIs tend to
be quite persistent. The high autocorrelation that characterizes the
FCIs is also evident in the confidence intervals for the autoregressive
roots shown in table 2.3 We report confidence intervals, rather than
point estimates, to highlight that, after accounting for statistical
uncertainty, the FCIs plausibly have autoregressive roots very close
to one. In five cases, we are actually unable to reject the hypothesis
that the FCIs have a unit root. Given the nature of the problem we
study, asymptotic standard errors would normally be biased against
finding predictability, and the local-to-unit asymptotics procedure of
Campbell and Yogo (2006) corrects for this bias. Our results show
that the Campbell and Yogo (2006) procedure finds predictability
25 percent more often than OLS for innovations to macroeconomic
variables, and six times as often for stock returns.4
3The procedure for calculating the confidence intervals in table 2 is described
in the online appendix to Campbell and Yogo (2006).
4The direction and severity of the bias depend on the persistence of the pre-
dictor, on the correlation between the innovations to the predictor and to the
predicted variable (δ), and on the sign of the predictive relation (see the discus-
sion on the skewness of the t-statistic distribution in section 3.2 of Campbell and
Yogo 2006). Given the persistence of the FCIs, and assuming that poor finan-
cial conditions lead to negative returns/innovations to macroeconomic variables,
OLS should find predictability less often than the Campbell and Yogo (2006)
procedure for FCIs that increase in value when financial conditions deteriorate.
In order to run the Campbell and Yogo (2006) procedure, we need to make sure
that the correlation δ is negative, and we do so by multiplying an FCI by –1 if
needed. The figures mentioned in the text refer to predictive regressions based
on the full sample and where the FCIs, after being multiplied by –1 if needed,
increase in value when financial conditions deteriorate. This is the case for all the
full-sample regressions that predict returns, and for 78 percent of the full-sample
regressions that predict innovations to macroeconomic variables.
10 International Journal of Central Banking February 2017
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In practice, we assume that each of the FCIs follows an AR(1)
process, and use local-to-unity asymptotics unless the autoregressive
root of the FCI is sufficiently distant from one, in a sense defined
in footnote 5, or unless there is no correlation between the innova-
tions to the FCI’s autoregressive process and the innovations in a
regression of the predicted variable on the FCI.5 Note that both a
persistent predictor and a non-zero correlation are necessary for the
standard OLS asymptotics to be inappropriate.
The dependent variables in our predictive regressions are (i)
returns on a broad market index and on various industry portfo-
lios, and (ii) autoregressive residuals of log-changes in several eco-
nomic variables; we study residuals because, unlike returns, changes
in macroeconomic variables can be autocorrelated. We consider
monthly and quarterly returns on the S&P 500 and on seven
equally weighted industry portfolios: finance, construction, manu-
facturing, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, and services.
The macroeconomic variables we consider measure the availability of
credit (total consumer credit, and commercial and industrial loans),
the state of the housing market (housing starts), and manufactur-
ing activity (durable goods orders, industrial production, and total
manufacturing inventory).6
We present the results for the predictability of stock returns in
tables 4 through 7. For each portfolio/FCI combination we report the
coefficient on the FCI (βFCI) and the regression root mean squared
error (RMSE). We show an asterisk next to a coefficient when the
coefficient is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence
level.
5Using the notation in Campbell and Yogo (2006), we rely on
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors if the DF-GLS statistic is less than
–5 (a more negative DF-GLS statistic shifts the confidence interval for the autore-
gressive root of the predictor away from one), or if the parameter δˆ (which meas-
ures the correlation between the innovations) is equal to zero. When needed,
we linearly interpolate the values obtained from the lookup tables in the online
appendix to Campbell and Yogo (2006), which only provide a discrete set of
values for δˆ and of the DF-GLS statistic.
6Stock returns are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
through Wharton Research Data Services. The macroeconomic data are from the
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. See table 3 for summary statistics and additional details on the
construction of the industry portfolios.
12 International Journal of Central Banking February 2017
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Table 4 shows results for the 1995–2012 sample, and it indicates
that eleven of the twelve FCIs can predict returns on the finance
industry portfolio, that four can predict the S&P 500, and that the
Morgan Stanley index can predict returns on the finance and three
additional industry portfolios. There is noticeable dispersion in the
RMSEs across industry portfolios for a given FCI, with the construc-
tion and services portfolios generally showing the largest RMSE and
the finance portfolios the lowest, but the RMSEs are remarkably
similar across FCIs for a given portfolio. The statistically significant
coefficients have the expected negative sign, indicating that higher
levels of financial stress (or tighter financial conditions) tend to be
followed by lower returns.
The severity of the 2008 financial crisis naturally raises the ques-
tion of whether the predictive power of the FCIs mainly arises from
the events that started in early 2007, or whether it is also present in
the broader sample. In table 5 we report the coefficients and RMSEs
estimated over the 1995–2006 sample, and the results highlight that,
essentially, there is no meaningful predictability left. Later in this
section we discuss whether the lack of predictive power outside of
the 2008 crisis is due to predictability only being there during peri-
ods of financial stress, or whether it is the result of the FCIs being
tailored to the recent financial crisis.
The conclusions that we can draw from monthly returns also
carry over to quarterly returns (tables 6 and 7). Five FCIs have pre-
dictive power for returns on the S&P 500 or on the financial industry
portfolio in the 1995–2012 sample. Similar to the monthly analysis,
returns on the remaining industry portfolios are not predictable.
Restricting the sample to the pre-crisis period (1995–2006, table
7) all but eliminates the predictability, with the exception of the
Morgan Stanley index, which can now predict returns on five port-
folios. Note that the coefficients for the Morgan Stanley index are
positive, while they were negative at the monthly horizon in the
full sample (table 4). This difference is consistent with the possibil-
ity that measuring returns over longer horizons captures the early
signs of a turning business cycle. The Morgan Stanley index may
signal poor financial conditions when the business cycle is close to
its trough, and, while one-month-ahead returns may still be negative
as the economy bottoms out, one-quarter-ahead returns may already
capture the initial pickup in economic activity.
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We now discuss whether the FCIs are informative about future
innovations to the macroeconomic variables we mentioned earlier in
this section. In order to implement the Campbell and Yogo (2006)
procedure, the only covariate we include in the predictive regressions
is one of the FCIs, and we account for autocorrelation in macro-
economic variable changes by using the residuals from log-change
autoregressions as the dependent variable, where the number of lags
is chosen on the basis of the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion.7
The first set of results (table 8) focuses on one-month-ahead
predictability, with the sample running from 1995 to 2012.8 The
Chicago Fed, St. Louis Fed, Kansas City Fed, and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) FCI indexes predict all the variables; most
other indexes predict at least three of the six variables. When the
sample excludes the 2008 financial crisis (table 9), however, the evi-
dence in favor of predictability is weak, with most indexes being
able to predict only one macroeconomic variable, typically indus-
trial production. Similar conclusions can be drawn when focusing on
quarterly horizons, as shown in tables 10 and 11 (only the Morgan
Stanley index can predict more variables in the short sample than
in the full sample).9
7For the monthly series, we use two lags for total consumer credit, commercial
and industrial loans, industrial production, and total manufacturing inventory,
and one lag for durable goods orders and housing starts. For the quarterly series,
we use two lags for total consumer credit and total manufacturing inventory, one
lag for commercial and industrial loans and industrial production, and zero lags
for durable goods orders and housing starts.
8While we expect a negative relation between a worsening of current financial
conditions and future economic activity, some coefficients in tables 8 and 9 are
positive. The reason is that the Campbell and Yogo (2006) procedure requires a
negative correlation between current innovations to the dependent variable and
the predictor, hence we sometimes need to multiply the FCI by –1. We system-
atically check that the sign of the estimated coefficient is as expected: positive
if the FCI (multiplied by –1 as applicable) signals stress when low, and negative
otherwise.
9In an unreported analysis, we obtain similar results when, instead of exclud-
ing the period around the financial crisis, we orthogonalize the innovations rela-
tive to the appropriately lagged Chicago Fed National Activity Index, which is
a proxy for the current state of the economy. The similarity of the results when
(i) excluding the crisis and (ii) controlling for the state of the economy is not
surprising, especially in a relatively short sample like ours, because the financial
crisis also coincided with a severe recession, which exerts a strong leverage effect.
Vol. 13 No. 1 Assessing and Combining Financial Conditions 23
T
ab
le
8.
P
re
d
ic
ti
ve
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s:
In
n
ov
at
io
n
s
to
M
on
th
ly
L
og
-C
h
an
ge
s
in
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
V
ar
ia
b
le
s,
19
95
–2
01
2
B
F
C
I
B
F
C
I+
C
F
S
I
M
S
F
C
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
0.
07
8∗
0.
66
2
0.
10
5∗
0.
65
2
0.
07
2
0.
66
9
−0
.0
51
0.
67
1
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
−0
.0
34
0.
51
9
−0
.0
32
0.
51
9
−0
.0
47
0.
51
9
0.
01
8
0.
52
1
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
−0
.8
83
∗
3.
73
3
−0
.7
65
∗
3.
78
1
−0
.9
20
∗
3.
86
0
−0
.6
67
∗
3.
90
5
H
ou
si
ng
St
ar
ts
−1
.1
84
∗
6.
24
1
−0
.8
95
∗
6.
34
4
−0
.7
59
∗
6.
45
6
−0
.7
64
∗
6.
44
8
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
−0
.1
20
∗
0.
64
5
−0
.0
94
∗
0.
65
4
−0
.1
67
∗
0.
64
9
−0
.1
26
∗
0.
65
7
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
−0
.0
59
∗
0.
43
7
−0
.0
54
∗
0.
43
8
−0
.0
43
0.
44
4
−0
.0
71
∗
0.
43
9
A
N
F
C
I
N
F
C
I
C
L
N
F
S
I
S
T
L
F
S
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
0.
05
9
0.
67
2
0.
24
0∗
0.
65
8
−0
.0
38
0.
66
7
0.
18
0∗
0.
64
7
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
−0
.0
25
0.
52
1
−0
.1
29
∗
0.
51
6
−0
.0
17
0.
52
0
−0
.0
73
∗
0.
51
6
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
−1
.1
47
∗
3.
87
5
−2
.3
66
∗
3.
72
5
−0
.3
17
∗
3.
90
0
−1
.1
53
∗
3.
78
6
H
ou
si
ng
St
ar
ts
−1
.8
75
∗
6.
34
2
−2
.9
84
∗
6.
26
5
−0
.3
21
∗
6.
45
7
−1
.2
20
∗
6.
37
6
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
−0
.0
51
0.
67
0
−0
.3
21
∗
0.
64
5
0.
07
2∗
0.
64
9
−0
.1
62
∗
0.
65
0
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
−0
.0
50
0.
44
4
−0
.1
43
∗
0.
43
8
−0
.0
21
0.
44
3
−0
.0
73
∗
0.
43
9
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
)
24 International Journal of Central Banking February 2017
T
ab
le
8.
(C
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
C
it
i
F
C
I
IM
F
F
S
I
K
C
F
S
I
IM
F
F
C
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
0.
11
9∗
0.
66
0
0.
03
4∗
0.
66
1
0.
16
8∗
0.
64
7
0.
18
3∗
0.
64
9
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
−0
.0
34
0.
52
0
−0
.0
13
0.
51
9
−0
.0
61
∗
0.
51
7
−0
.0
68
∗
0.
51
7
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
−0
.8
34
∗
3.
86
0
−0
.3
35
∗
3.
77
2
−1
.2
47
∗
3.
73
1
−1
.3
56
∗
3.
74
6
H
ou
si
ng
St
ar
ts
1.
16
2∗
6.
36
9
−0
.4
14
∗
6.
31
7
−1
.2
82
∗
6.
34
9
−1
.3
90
∗
6.
35
9
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
0.
18
0∗
0.
64
0
−0
.0
44
∗
0.
65
1
0.
17
7∗
0.
64
3
−0
.2
13
∗
0.
63
8
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
−0
.0
75
∗
0.
43
8
−0
.0
17
∗
0.
44
2
−0
.0
71
∗
0.
43
9
−0
.1
06
∗
0.
43
4
N
o
te
s:
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
an
d
ro
ot
m
ea
n
sq
ua
re
d
er
ro
rs
(b
ot
h
in
%
)
of
pr
ed
ic
ti
ve
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
on
e-
m
on
th
-a
he
ad
in
no
va
ti
on
s
to
lo
g-
ch
an
ge
s
in
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
on
F
C
I
le
ve
ls
.
Se
e
ta
bl
es
1
an
d
3
fo
r
m
or
e
de
ta
ils
on
th
e
F
C
Is
an
d
on
th
e
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s.
A
st
er
is
ks
in
di
ca
te
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
90
p
er
ce
nt
le
ve
l.
St
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
is
ev
al
ua
te
d
on
th
e
ba
si
s
of
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
ti
ci
ty
-c
on
si
st
en
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
or
,
w
he
re
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e,
w
it
h
th
e
lo
ca
l-
to
-u
ni
ty
as
ym
pt
ot
ic
s
of
C
am
pb
el
l
an
d
Y
og
o
(2
00
6)
(s
ee
se
ct
io
n
2
fo
r
de
ta
ils
).
T
im
e
p
er
io
d:
Ju
ly
19
95
to
Ju
ne
20
12
.
Vol. 13 No. 1 Assessing and Combining Financial Conditions 25
T
ab
le
9.
P
re
d
ic
ti
ve
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s:
In
n
ov
at
io
n
s
to
M
on
th
ly
L
og
-C
h
an
ge
s
in
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
V
ar
ia
b
le
s,
19
95
–2
00
6
B
F
C
I
B
F
C
I+
C
F
S
I
M
S
F
C
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
−0
.0
85
0.
58
3
−0
.0
87
∗
0.
58
0
0.
04
2
0.
58
6
−0
.0
41
0.
58
6
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
0.
03
0
0.
33
2
0.
04
0
0.
33
1
0.
00
5
0.
33
3
−0
.0
29
0.
33
2
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
0.
33
9
3.
68
3
0.
30
9
3.
68
1
0.
42
0
3.
68
1
−0
.1
70
3.
69
0
H
ou
si
ng
St
ar
ts
0.
22
5
5.
24
9
0.
38
2
5.
23
8
0.
41
4
5.
24
4
0.
45
5
5.
23
0
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
0.
13
8∗
0.
54
7
0.
05
9
0.
55
6
−0
.0
92
0.
55
5
−0
.0
82
∗
0.
55
2
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
−0
.0
40
0.
38
3
−0
.0
52
0.
38
0
−0
.0
22
0.
38
4
−0
.0
75
∗
0.
37
5
A
N
F
C
I
N
F
C
I
C
L
N
F
S
I
S
T
L
F
S
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
−0
.0
58
0.
58
6
0.
21
7
0.
58
5
−0
.0
57
∗
0.
57
7
−0
.2
21
∗
0.
57
6
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
−0
.0
58
0.
33
2
−0
.1
18
0.
33
2
0.
01
5
0.
33
2
−0
.0
16
0.
33
3
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
0.
17
9
3.
69
3
2.
12
8
3.
65
7
−0
.1
85
3.
67
7
0.
66
7
3.
67
9
H
ou
si
ng
St
ar
ts
0.
12
0
5.
25
2
0.
46
5
5.
25
1
0.
14
5
5.
24
5
−0
.8
27
5.
23
6
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
−0
.0
54
0.
55
9
0.
36
3∗
0.
55
2
0.
05
8∗
0.
54
8
0.
15
3
0.
55
4
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
0.
04
8
0.
38
3
−0
.1
79
0.
38
2
−0
.0
33
∗
0.
37
9
−0
.0
98
0.
38
1
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
)
26 International Journal of Central Banking February 2017
T
ab
le
9.
(C
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
C
it
i
F
C
I
IM
F
F
S
I
K
C
F
S
I
IM
F
F
C
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
0.
07
6
0.
58
2
0.
00
9
0.
58
7
0.
12
8
0.
58
2
0.
22
7∗
0.
57
0
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
0.
02
1
0.
33
3
0.
02
0∗
0.
33
0
0.
05
8
0.
33
2
0.
05
5
0.
33
2
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
−0
.2
74
3.
68
3
0.
18
7
3.
67
0
0.
87
6
3.
65
5
−0
.8
07
3.
65
9
H
ou
s.
St
ar
ts
−0
.2
56
5.
24
6
−0
.0
91
5.
24
9
0.
14
4
5.
25
2
0.
49
0
5.
24
4
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
0.
13
2∗
0.
54
2
0.
04
1∗
0.
55
2
0.
16
9∗
0.
55
0
−0
.1
47
∗
0.
55
2
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
0.
05
2
0.
38
0
−0
.0
16
0.
38
3
−0
.0
79
0.
38
1
−0
.1
49
∗
0.
37
3
N
o
te
s:
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
an
d
ro
ot
m
ea
n
sq
ua
re
d
er
ro
rs
(b
ot
h
in
%
)
of
pr
ed
ic
ti
ve
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
on
e-
m
on
th
-a
he
ad
in
no
va
ti
on
s
to
lo
g-
ch
an
ge
s
in
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
on
F
C
I
le
ve
ls
.
Se
e
ta
bl
es
1
an
d
3
fo
r
m
or
e
de
ta
ils
on
th
e
F
C
Is
an
d
on
th
e
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s.
A
st
er
is
ks
in
di
ca
te
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
90
p
er
ce
nt
le
ve
l.
St
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
is
ev
al
ua
te
d
on
th
e
ba
si
s
of
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
ti
ci
ty
-c
on
si
st
en
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
or
,
w
he
re
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e,
w
it
h
th
e
lo
ca
l-
to
-u
ni
ty
as
ym
pt
ot
ic
s
of
C
am
pb
el
l
an
d
Y
og
o
(2
00
6)
(s
ee
se
ct
io
n
2
fo
r
de
ta
ils
).
T
im
e
p
er
io
d:
Ju
ly
19
95
to
D
ec
em
b
er
20
06
.
Vol. 13 No. 1 Assessing and Combining Financial Conditions 27
T
ab
le
10
.
P
re
d
ic
ti
ve
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s:
In
n
ov
at
io
n
s
to
Q
u
ar
te
rl
y
L
og
-C
h
an
ge
s
in
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
V
ar
ia
b
le
s,
19
95
–2
01
2
B
F
C
I
B
F
C
I+
C
F
S
I
M
S
F
C
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
0.
40
6∗
1.
22
9
0.
47
7∗
1.
16
1
0.
57
1∗
1.
26
0
−0
.4
14
∗
1.
30
5
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
−0
.0
99
1.
00
3
−0
.1
22
0.
99
6
−0
.1
21
1.
00
7
−0
.0
29
1.
01
4
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
−1
.8
58
∗
5.
30
8
−1
.6
37
∗
5.
48
3
−1
.4
13
∗
5.
89
6
−1
.4
50
∗
5.
84
0
H
ou
si
ng
St
ar
ts
−1
.3
73
∗
8.
64
5
−0
.8
03
8.
82
2
−1
.0
77
∗
8.
84
6
0.
78
1
8.
87
0
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
−0
.2
48
∗
1.
29
1
−0
.1
67
1.
32
4
−0
.3
71
∗
1.
29
6
−0
.3
48
∗
1.
29
0
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
−0
.2
85
∗
1.
11
2
−0
.2
57
∗
1.
12
8
−0
.2
38
∗
1.
17
5
−0
.1
97
1.
17
9
A
N
F
C
I
N
F
C
I
C
L
N
F
S
I
S
T
L
F
S
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
0.
54
8∗
1.
31
4
1.
23
8∗
1.
17
6
0.
20
4∗
1.
29
8
0.
75
2∗
1.
15
5
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
−0
.0
64
1.
01
4
−0
.3
29
0.
99
6
−0
.0
14
1.
01
4
−0
.1
74
0.
99
9
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
−2
.6
43
∗
5.
67
9
−4
.9
35
∗
5.
31
1
−0
.7
08
∗
5.
82
4
−2
.2
78
∗
5.
60
4
H
ou
si
ng
St
ar
ts
−2
.6
57
8.
65
1
−4
.1
71
∗
8.
56
2
−0
.3
86
8.
86
5
−0
.7
84
8.
87
8
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
−0
.0
61
1.
34
9
−0
.6
57
∗
1.
29
2
−0
.1
63
∗
1.
29
1
−0
.2
89
∗
1.
31
7
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
0.
42
0∗
1.
15
1
−0
.5
78
∗
1.
15
0
−0
.1
01
∗
1.
17
5
−0
.2
58
∗
1.
17
1
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
)
28 International Journal of Central Banking February 2017
T
ab
le
10
.
(C
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
C
it
i
F
C
I
IM
F
F
S
I
K
C
F
S
I
IM
F
F
C
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
0.
52
6∗
1.
24
6
0.
20
1∗
1.
19
1
0.
78
0∗
1.
11
7
0.
81
2∗
1.
13
2
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
−0
.0
89
1.
01
0
−0
.0
38
1.
00
6
−0
.1
45
1.
00
3
−0
.2
08
∗
0.
99
4
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
−1
.6
35
∗
5.
76
5
−0
.6
35
∗
5.
63
7
−2
.4
15
∗
5.
50
8
−2
.8
66
∗
5.
36
9
H
ou
si
ng
St
ar
ts
−1
.0
25
8.
83
4
−0
.3
75
8.
81
5
−1
.1
63
8.
82
9
−2
.0
11
∗
8.
69
0
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
−0
.3
84
∗
1.
27
4
−0
.1
17
∗
1.
28
5
−0
.3
93
∗
1.
28
5
−0
.4
30
∗
1.
28
1
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
0.
33
4∗
1.
13
6
−0
.0
94
∗
1.
15
3
−0
.2
82
∗
1.
16
3
−0
.3
75
∗
1.
14
1
N
o
te
s:
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
an
d
ro
ot
m
ea
n
sq
ua
re
d
er
ro
rs
(b
ot
h
in
%
)
of
pr
ed
ic
ti
ve
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
on
e-
qu
ar
te
r-
ah
ea
d
in
no
va
ti
on
s
to
lo
g-
ch
an
ge
s
in
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
on
F
C
I
le
ve
ls
.
Se
e
ta
bl
es
1
an
d
3
fo
r
m
or
e
de
ta
ils
on
th
e
F
C
Is
an
d
on
th
e
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s.
A
st
er
is
ks
in
di
ca
te
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
90
p
er
ce
nt
le
ve
l.
St
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
is
ev
al
ua
te
d
on
th
e
ba
si
s
of
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
ti
ci
ty
-c
on
si
st
en
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
or
,
w
he
re
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e,
w
it
h
th
e
lo
ca
l-
to
-u
ni
ty
as
ym
pt
ot
ic
s
of
C
am
pb
el
l
an
d
Y
og
o
(2
00
6)
(s
ee
se
ct
io
n
2
fo
r
de
ta
ils
).
T
im
e
p
er
io
d:
Ju
ly
19
95
to
Ju
ne
20
12
.
Vol. 13 No. 1 Assessing and Combining Financial Conditions 29
T
ab
le
11
.
P
re
d
ic
ti
ve
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s:
In
n
ov
at
io
n
s
to
Q
u
ar
te
rl
y
L
og
-C
h
an
ge
s
in
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
V
ar
ia
b
le
s,
19
95
–2
00
6
B
F
C
I
B
F
C
I+
C
F
S
I
M
S
F
C
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
0.
43
1∗
1.
11
1
0.
39
9∗
1.
09
5
0.
43
6
1.
12
7
−0
.2
92
1.
11
8
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
0.
05
8
0.
60
7
0.
02
8
0.
60
9
0.
09
4
0.
60
6
−0
.0
65
0.
60
5
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
0.
95
6
4.
42
6
−0
.9
60
4.
38
9
0.
74
8
4.
46
9
−0
.7
68
∗
4.
40
8
H
ou
si
ng
St
ar
ts
1.
51
3
5.
34
9
1.
75
8∗
5.
19
0
1.
21
0
5.
43
4
1.
50
6∗
5.
20
3
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
−0
.2
61
1.
09
7
−0
.0
96
1.
11
5
−0
.0
87
1.
11
8
−0
.2
16
∗
1.
08
9
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
−0
.3
64
∗
0.
87
6
−0
.3
74
∗
0.
84
5
−0
.2
32
0.
91
5
−0
.3
16
∗
0.
85
1
A
N
F
C
I
N
F
C
I
C
L
N
F
S
I
S
T
L
F
S
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
0.
06
1
1.
17
2
1.
37
5∗
1.
11
0
−0
.1
91
∗
1.
10
9
0.
76
1∗
1.
10
4
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
−0
.1
76
0.
60
1
−0
.3
52
0.
60
2
0.
03
0
0.
60
7
0.
02
7
0.
60
9
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
0.
48
0
4.
49
4
3.
93
0
4.
37
2
−0
.4
92
∗
4.
39
6
−1
.3
37
4.
45
0
H
ou
si
ng
St
ar
ts
0.
50
1
5.
49
9
2.
04
4
5.
47
8
−0
.3
36
5.
46
7
2.
54
6
5.
34
7
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
−0
.1
60
1.
11
6
−0
.6
93
1.
10
3
−0
.1
18
1.
09
5
−0
.3
10
1.
10
8
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
0.
00
9
0.
93
1
−1
.1
89
∗
0.
87
2
−0
.1
65
∗
0.
87
2
−0
.6
25
∗
0.
87
3
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
)
30 International Journal of Central Banking February 2017
T
ab
le
11
.
(C
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
C
it
i
F
C
I
IM
F
F
S
I
K
C
F
S
I
IM
F
F
C
I
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
β
F
C
I
R
M
S
E
C
&
I
0.
34
4∗
1.
11
1
0.
13
7∗
1.
12
1
0.
69
9∗
1.
08
5
0.
81
0∗
1.
05
2
C
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
0.
05
0
0.
60
7
−0
.0
47
0.
59
8
0.
19
1
0.
59
7
−0
.0
66
0.
60
8
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
−0
.4
13
4.
48
1
−0
.3
20
4.
43
2
1.
60
7
4.
38
6
−2
.0
54
∗
4.
30
8
H
ou
si
ng
St
ar
ts
0.
25
5
5.
50
0
−0
.0
85
5.
50
3
0.
51
5
5.
49
7
1.
04
3
5.
46
7
In
d.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
0.
36
2∗
1.
04
9
−0
.1
42
∗
1.
06
2
−0
.4
26
∗
1.
08
7
−0
.3
03
1.
10
3
T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
y
0.
31
7∗
0.
86
5
0.
14
2∗
0.
86
1
0.
52
3∗
0.
87
0
−0
.6
05
∗
0.
84
7
N
o
te
s:
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
an
d
ro
ot
m
ea
n
sq
ua
re
d
er
ro
rs
(b
ot
h
in
%
)
of
pr
ed
ic
ti
ve
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
on
e-
qu
ar
te
r-
ah
ea
d
in
no
va
ti
on
s
to
lo
g-
ch
an
ge
s
in
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
on
F
C
I
le
ve
ls
.
Se
e
ta
bl
es
1
an
d
3
fo
r
m
or
e
de
ta
ils
on
th
e
F
C
Is
an
d
on
th
e
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s.
A
st
er
is
ks
in
di
ca
te
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
90
p
er
ce
nt
le
ve
l.
St
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
is
ev
al
ua
te
d
on
th
e
ba
si
s
of
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
ti
ci
ty
-c
on
si
st
en
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
or
,
w
he
re
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e,
w
it
h
th
e
lo
ca
l-
to
-u
ni
ty
as
ym
pt
ot
ic
s
of
C
am
pb
el
l
an
d
Y
og
o
(2
00
6)
(s
ee
se
ct
io
n
2
fo
r
de
ta
ils
).
T
im
e
p
er
io
d:
Ju
ly
19
95
to
D
ec
em
b
er
20
06
.
Vol. 13 No. 1 Assessing and Combining Financial Conditions 31
2.2 Granger Causality Tests
In the final part of our predictability analysis, we study the relation
between each of the FCIs and selected measures of credit availability.
Borio (2014) highlights that the financial cycle can amplify macro-
economic fluctuations and contribute to significant economic dislo-
cations, and that one key component of the financial cycle is credit
availability. Borio (2014) also suggests that peaks in the financial
cycle are closely associated with financial crises, which implies that
the results of our tests in this section can provide additional evidence
on whether FCIs are a useful signal for an upcoming financial crisis.
The measures of credit availability that we consider are consumer
credit, mortgage credit, and the issuance of commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS), all expressed as a fraction of nominal
gross domestic product. The last two variables are directly related
to the real estate boom that set the stage for the 2008 financial crisis,
with one of them also measuring the importance of credit provision
through the securitization channel.10
We depart from the methodology of Campbell and Yogo (2006)
when studying the relation between the FCIs and the measures of
credit availability, and we conduct a series of Granger causality tests
instead. The reason is that it is the overall level of credit availabil-
ity, rather than its changes or innovations, that contributes to the
buildup of financial vulnerabilities during financial booms and that
sets the stage for future financial crises (see the discussion in Borio
2014). By using Granger causality tests based on quarterly vector
autoregressions with an appropriate number of lags, we can focus
on levels and still account for the persistence of both the FCIs and
the credit availability variables. We use the procedure described in
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) to account for the fact that the FCIs
and the credit availability variables may not only be persistent but
also potentially integrated in small samples.
10The consumer credit and mortgage credit data is from the Federal Reserve’s
Z.1 release. Consumer credit is series LA153166000.Q (household and non-profit
organizations; consumer credit), while mortgage credit is series LA153165105.Q
(household and non-profit organizations; home mortgages). CMBS issuance is
total issuance less Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, resecuritized, and foreign property
issuance, and it is provided by Commercial Mortgage Alert. Nominal gross domes-
tic product is the series GDP from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.
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For each FCI/credit variable pair, we select the optimal num-
ber of vector autoregression lags (m) with the Schwarz Bayesian
information criterion. We then use augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
to determine each series’ order of integration, and define n as the
maximum order of integration for the two series. Next, we estimate
a vector autoregression with m + n lags. Using heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors, we construct Wald test statistics to deter-
mine the joint statistical significance of the coefficients on the first
m lags of the FCI in the equation for the credit availability variable,
and the joint statistical significance of the coefficients on the first m
lags of the credit availability variable in the equation for the FCI.
These are the Granger causality tests, and the null hypothesis is
that the coefficients are jointly zero. Table 12 reports the resulting
p-values.
The top panel of table 12 shows the p-values of tests of whether
the FCIs Granger-cause the indicated credit availability measure,
and the bottom panel shows the results of tests that the credit avail-
ability measures Granger-cause the FCIs. In the left panels we use
the full sample, which runs from 1995 to 2012. In the right panels
we evaluate to what extent the results are affected by observations
corresponding to the financial crisis by setting the 2008 observa-
tions of the dependent variables to missing.11 We assess the robust-
ness of the results to the financial crisis by excluding only one year
(2008), because the credit availability variables have a strong trend
before the crisis and only after 2007 do they exhibit significant vari-
ation (Borio 2014 highlights that the financial cycle evolves more
slowly than the economic cycle). Truncating the sample after 2007
would have eliminated the variation that is likely most important
for identifying the effect we are interested in.
In the full sample, consumer credit, mortgage credit, and CMBS
issuance are Granger-caused by five, four, and three FCIs, respec-
tively. After setting the 2008 observations of the credit availability
measures to missing, no FCIs Granger-cause CMBS issuance, and
three out of twelve still Granger-cause consumer credit and mort-
gage credit. Focusing on whether the FCIs are Granger-caused by
credit availability, only six tests of the seventy-two that we report
11We set the observations to missing rather than dropping them to avoid using
2007:Q4 as the first lag for 2009:Q1.
Vol. 13 No. 1 Assessing and Combining Financial Conditions 33
T
ab
le
12
.
F
C
Is
an
d
M
ea
su
re
s
of
C
re
d
it
A
va
il
ab
il
it
y
:
G
ra
n
ge
r
C
au
sa
li
ty
T
es
ts
F
u
ll
S
am
p
le
E
x
cl
u
d
in
g
20
08
C
C
R
/
M
T
G
/
C
M
B
S
/
C
C
R
/
M
T
G
/
C
M
B
S
/
G
D
P
G
D
P
G
D
P
G
D
P
G
D
P
G
D
P
F
C
Is
G
ra
ng
er
-C
au
si
ng
C
re
di
t
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y
B
F
C
I
0.
12
0.
17
0.
34
0.
36
0.
20
0.
66
B
F
C
I+
0.
20
0.
16
0.
69
0.
72
0.
62
0.
75
C
F
SI
0.
62
0.
51
0.
06
∗
0.
68
0.
57
0.
16
M
S
F
C
I
0.
65
0.
74
0.
98
0.
87
0.
80
0.
59
C
L
N
F
SI
0.
21
0.
90
0.
56
0.
21
0.
93
0.
71
N
F
C
I
0.
03
∗∗
0.
06
∗
0.
10
0.
07
∗
0.
20
0.
23
A
N
F
C
I
0.
04
∗∗
0.
40
0.
07
∗
0.
27
0.
06
∗
0.
30
ST
L
F
SI
0.
13
0.
02
∗∗
0.
21
0.
20
0.
16
0.
16
K
C
F
SI
0.
07
∗
0.
06
∗
0.
16
0.
13
0.
15
0.
33
C
it
i
F
C
I
0.
01
∗∗
∗
0.
43
0.
23
0.
02
∗∗
0.
26
0.
73
IM
F
F
C
I
0.
01
∗∗
∗
0.
14
0.
09
∗
0.
01
∗∗
∗
0.
08
∗
0.
11
IM
F
F
SI
0.
34
0.
06
∗
0.
51
0.
46
0.
05
∗∗
0.
61
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
)
34 International Journal of Central Banking February 2017
T
ab
le
12
.
(C
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
F
u
ll
S
am
p
le
E
x
cl
u
d
in
g
20
08
C
C
R
/
M
T
G
/
C
M
B
S
/
C
C
R
/
M
T
G
/
C
M
B
S
/
G
D
P
G
D
P
G
D
P
G
D
P
G
D
P
G
D
P
C
re
di
t
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y
G
ra
ng
er
-C
au
si
ng
F
C
Is
B
F
C
I
0.
42
0.
19
0.
93
0.
17
0.
27
0.
63
B
F
C
I+
0.
23
0.
09
∗
0.
66
0.
07
∗
0.
32
0.
45
C
F
SI
0.
27
0.
82
0.
33
0.
39
0.
73
0.
56
M
S
F
C
I
0.
11
0.
80
0.
78
0.
07
∗
0.
56
0.
34
C
L
N
F
SI
0.
17
0.
72
0.
25
0.
19
0.
54
0.
12
N
F
C
I
0.
61
0.
30
0.
81
0.
41
0.
78
0.
84
A
N
F
C
I
0.
95
0.
44
0.
18
0.
77
0.
92
0.
50
ST
L
F
SI
0.
29
0.
14
0.
61
0.
15
0.
36
0.
52
K
C
F
SI
0.
98
0.
06
∗
0.
50
0.
27
0.
71
0.
70
C
it
i
F
C
I
0.
10
0.
72
0.
34
0.
10
∗
0.
94
0.
65
IM
F
F
C
I
0.
56
0.
05
∗∗
0.
33
0.
41
0.
16
0.
26
IM
F
F
SI
0.
75
0.
40
0.
73
0.
80
0.
53
0.
89
N
o
te
s:
T
he
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
p-
va
lu
es
fr
om
te
st
s
th
at
th
e
gi
ve
n
F
C
I
G
ra
ng
er
-c
au
se
s
th
e
in
di
ca
te
d
m
ea
su
re
of
cr
ed
it
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
(t
op
pa
ne
l)
an
d
th
at
th
e
gi
ve
n
cr
ed
it
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
m
ea
su
re
G
ra
ng
er
-c
au
se
s
th
e
in
di
ca
te
d
F
C
I
(b
ot
to
m
pa
ne
l)
.
T
he
m
ea
su
re
s
ar
e
co
ns
um
er
cr
ed
it
ov
er
no
m
in
al
G
D
P
(C
C
R
/G
D
P
),
m
or
tg
ag
e
cr
ed
it
ov
er
no
m
in
al
G
D
P
(M
T
G
/G
D
P
),
an
d
is
su
an
ce
of
co
m
m
er
ci
al
m
or
tg
ag
e-
ba
ck
ed
se
cu
ri
ti
es
ov
er
no
m
in
al
G
D
P
(C
M
B
S/
G
D
P
).
W
e
ch
oo
se
th
e
nu
m
b
er
of
la
gs
fo
r
th
e
ve
ct
or
au
to
re
gr
es
si
on
s
un
de
rl
yi
ng
th
e
te
st
s
by
su
m
m
in
g
th
e
op
ti
m
al
la
g
ch
os
en
w
it
h
th
e
Sc
hw
ar
z
B
ay
es
ia
n
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
cr
it
er
io
n
an
d
th
e
m
ax
im
um
or
de
r
of
in
te
gr
at
io
n
of
th
e
tw
o
se
ri
es
in
th
e
ve
ct
or
au
to
re
gr
es
si
on
ch
os
en
w
it
h
au
gm
en
te
d
D
ic
ke
y-
Fu
lle
r
te
st
s
(T
od
a
an
d
Y
am
am
ot
o
19
95
).
W
e
co
nc
lu
de
th
at
th
er
e
is
G
ra
ng
er
ca
us
al
it
y
if
a
W
al
d
te
st
re
je
ct
s
th
e
nu
ll
hy
p
ot
he
si
s
th
at
th
e
la
gg
ed
va
lu
es
of
th
e
in
de
p
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
ar
e
eq
ua
l
to
ze
ro
.
N
ot
e
th
at
,
fo
llo
w
in
g
T
od
a
an
d
Y
am
am
ot
o
(1
99
5)
,
w
e
on
ly
te
st
th
at
th
e
fir
st
m
la
gs
ar
e
eq
ua
l
to
ze
ro
,
w
he
re
m
is
th
e
nu
m
b
er
of
la
gs
id
en
ti
fie
d
as
op
ti
m
al
w
it
h
th
e
Sc
hw
ar
z
cr
it
er
io
n.
T
he
sy
m
b
ol
s
**
*,
**
,
an
d
*
in
di
ca
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
1
p
er
ce
nt
,
5
p
er
ce
nt
,
an
d
10
p
er
ce
nt
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
Vol. 13 No. 1 Assessing and Combining Financial Conditions 35
in the bottom panel reject the null of no Granger causality. These
results suggest that, if we exclude 2008, neither the FCIs nor the
credit availability measures Granger-cause each other. The reason
is that only six tests out of thirty-six (16.7 percent) reject the null
that the FCIs do not Granger-cause the credit variables, and the
number drops to three out of thirty-six (8.3 percent) when we test
whether the credit variables Granger cause the FCIs. In both cases,
the incidence of rejections is roughly in line with the expected num-
ber of false positives for tests that have a significance level of 10
percent. In the full sample, the evidence is less clear on whether the
FCIs Granger-cause the credit variables, because twelve tests out of
thirty-six (33.3 percent) reject the null of no Granger causality. The
number of tests that reject the null that the credit variables do not
Granger-cause the FCIs remains three out of thirty-six.
2.3 Interpreting Our Results
Overall, our opinion is that the empirical evidence in favor of the
FCIs having reliable predictive power is weak. Given that the FCIs
are built by combining public data for typically highly liquid finan-
cial instruments, they can hardly be characterized as containing
privileged information. We discuss three possible explanations for
the predictability we find in some of our results: threshold effects,
data mining, and non-synchronous trading. We ultimately conclude
that those results are mainly driven by data mining and by non-
synchronous trading.
The predictability could be the result of threshold effects, in that
financial conditions matter only after they deteriorate sufficiently.12
In figure 2 we show a scatter plot of innovations to log-changes
of total inventories against the St. Louis FCI, where observations
for which the index is above its 80th percentile are highlighted by
different shapes. Triangles indicate an observation from between
12In Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), for instance, financing constraints at
the firm level only become binding in tight-money environments. Hubrich and
Tetlow (2012) find that macroeconomic dynamics crucially depend on financial
stress, with stress being “of negligible importance in ‘normal’ times, but of critical
importance when the economy is in a high-stress . . . state” (page 30).
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Figure 2. Threshold Effects
Notes: The plot shows a scatter of innovations to log-changes in total invento-
ries against the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s Financial Stress Index. The
squares and triangles correspond to observations for which the index is above its
80th percentile, with the triangles indicating an observation from between 2007
and 2012 and the squares indicating an observation from outside that range. Time
period: July 1995 to June 2012.
2007 and 2012, and squares indicate an observation from outside
that range.13
The evidence in figure 2 does not clearly point to a thresh-
old effect. There is indeed a negative relationship between the FCI
and log-changes in inventories; however, this negative relationship is
strong only in the observations from the recent crisis. One possible
explanation is that the variables underlying the many FCIs con-
structed after the 2008 crisis were chosen based on their movements
during the crisis. For instance, the FCIs typically include variables
like the spread between three-month LIBOR and the three-month
Treasury-bill rate (the TED spread), which had unusually large
movements during the 2008 crisis. Figure 3 shows the time series of
13Figure 2 is representative of other index/variable combinations. The unre-
ported figures are available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 3. Time Series of the TED Spread
Notes: The graph shows the time series of the spread, in basis points, between
the three-month USD LIBOR and the three-month U.S. Treasury yield, which is
commonly referred to as the “TED spread.” Data are from the British Bankers’
Association and the Federal Reserve H.15 statistical release. The vertical lines
highlight five events that range from the Asian crisis in 1997 to the European
debt crisis in 2010.
the TED spread from 1986 onwards, and it highlights the unusually
high level of the TED spread that was a feature of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis. Unfortunately, in practice it is difficult to distinguish a
threshold effect from possible data mining, not least because only
one major financial crisis is included in the sample.
Another potential source of predictability is non-synchronous
trading across markets. Many FCIs, for instance, include the implied
volatility index VIX, which is derived from the prices of S&P 500
index options. These options trade for fifteen minutes after trading
in the underlying index ends (4:15 p.m. versus 4:00 p.m. eastern
standard time)14 with the consequence that VIX on day t contains
information that will be reflected in stock prices only on day t + 1—a
fact that can generate spurious predictability (see Atchison, Butler,
and Simonds 1987 for a discussion of the effects of non-synchronous
14Details on the trading hours of S&P 500 index options can be found at
http://www.cboe.com/products/indexopts/spx spec.aspx
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trading on the autocorrelation of equity index returns). We explore
this possibility by running predictive regressions on returns that
exclude the first day of each holding period.
Table 13 shows that now only five of the twelve FCIs have sta-
tistically significant predictive power for the finance portfolio, down
from eleven in table 4, suggesting that non-synchronous trading does
play a role but is not the sole driver of predictability. In unreported
results, we find that excluding the first day of each quarter does not
change the significance patterns of tables 6 and 7; most likely, the
effect of non-synchronous trading is diluted by the larger variation
of returns measured over longer horizons.
The notion that FCIs only have weak predictive power is also
supported by a series of Granger causality tests. These tests focus
on the dynamic relation between the FCIs and a set of measures
for the availability of consumer credit, mortgage credit, and CMBS
issuance. Two of these variables are closely related to the housing
boom that characterized the 2000s, and CMBS issuance also meas-
ures the importance of the securitization channel for the provision
of commercial real estate credit. Even though both the variables of
interest and the statistical approach are different than in the predic-
tive regression analysis, this additional set of results supports our
main conclusion that the FCIs do not have predictive power if one
excludes the 2008 financial crisis from the sample.
Finally, we should emphasize that we do not conduct an out-
of-sample analysis, which would be a more stringent test of pre-
dictability, because our in-sample analysis already finds a lack of
reliable predictive power.
3. Combining FCIs
We now turn to the question of how to consolidate the increasingly
large number of indexes into a single proxy for financial conditions.
The FCIs themselves are already an aggregation of underlying vari-
ables, and the procedure we describe below can be seen as a higher-
level consolidation that aggregates across different variable sets and
methodologies, with the objective of reducing model uncertainty for
policymakers. As discussed in the introduction, the various FCIs
follow similar long-run trends, but they can give significantly differ-
ent readings on financial conditions at a given point in time (e.g.,
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see figure 1). When aggregating the FCIs, we first select a smaller
subsample of indexes, and then search for the “best” combination.
In the first step, we sort the individual indexes on the basis of how
well they capture the information contained in the remaining FCIs.
We measure this ability to capture information using the adjusted
R2 from regressions15 of changes in the first principal component of
all indexes except for index i on changes in index i. Letting i denote
the FCI of interest, with i = 1, . . . , 12 and “fpc” the first principal
component,
PC−i = fpc({FCIj}j =i)
ΔPC−i = γ + δ × ΔFCIi + εt.
Table 14 reports the adjusted R2s of the regressions described above,
which we run on two different samples, 1995–2006 and 1995–2012.
The rankings in the two samples are quite similar, with the St. Louis
FCI, in particular, having a noticeable margin over the other indexes.
We use the ranking to select the five FCIs with the highest adjusted
R2 for further aggregation. The two Bloomberg FCIs are ranked
among the top five when the sample includes the period surround-
ing the 2008 financial crisis; however, given that the two indexes are
built in a similar way, and that BFCI+ ranks noticeably worse than
BFCI in the shorter sample, we exclude BFCI+ from the set of best-
performing indexes. We replace BFCI+ with the Kansas City index,
which ranks sixth in the 1995–2012 sample and fifth when excluding
the years around the 2008 financial crisis.
Three aspects of our setup warrant further discussion. First, the
ranking criterion does not compare the FCIs with a benchmark,
because financial conditions are an unobservable factor. We also do
not use forecasting errors to select or optimally combine the various
predictors (e.g., Timmermann 2006), because in the first part of the
paper we find that FCIs are not particularly reliable at forecasting
either returns or macroeconomic variables. Second, it is in princi-
ple possible that a regression yields a low R2 because index i is a
radically better proxy for financial conditions and does not span the
remaining FCIs. However, the overlap and the encompassing nature
15We use robust regressions (Hamilton 1991), which reduce the influence of
outliers.
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of the variables that underlie the different indexes make such a pos-
sibility unlikely. Third, we choose to select five FCIs, and the choice
of this number is admittedly arbitrary, but the key point is that we
are able to reduce the number of combinations we consider, thus
lowering the likelihood that our results are driven by data mining.
In the second step we form all combinations of the five indexes
selected above,16 calculate each combination’s first principal compo-
nent, and regress17 changes in the first principal component of the
FCIs that are not in the combination under consideration (out of
the twelve we study) on changes in the first principal component of
the combination. Letting C denote the combination of interest,
PC/∈C = fpc({FCIj}j /∈C)
PC∈C = fpc({FCIj}j∈C)
ΔPC/∈C = γ + δ × ΔPC∈C + εt.
In order to minimize the risk of overfitting, the regressions are run
on several subsamples, and we use the resulting set of adjusted R2 to
select the “best” combination of FCIs. Specifically, we calculate, for
each combination and in each subsample, the squared deviation of
the combination’s adjusted R2 relative to the highest adjusted R2 in
each subsample. We then average, for each combination, the squared
deviations across time periods, and use the averages to identify the
“best” composite FCI. Table 15 reports five averages: the first (col-
umn A) shows arithmetic averages; in the second (B) the average
is weighted by the ratio of daily S&P 500 return volatility in each
subsample over the volatility in the full sample; in the third (C) it
is weighted by the ratio of the average VIX level in each subsam-
ple over the average VIX level in the full sample; in the fourth (D)
weights are based on the volatility of daily VIX changes; in the fifth
(E) the arithmetic average is calculated on the four non-overlapping
samples (7/95–12/98 through 1/06–6/12).
The criterion we use to rank the FCIs is, of course, one of poten-
tially many. For example, we could have selected the FCIs with the
16We form thirty-one different combinations: five individual indexes, ten sets
of two indexes, ten sets of three indexes, five sets of four indexes, and one set of
five indexes.
17We again use robust regressions (see Hamilton 1991).
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lowest volatility. Such choice would have implied an assumption on
the way financial conditions change over time, namely that they
evolve smoothly. Choosing the FCIs with the highest volatility would
have implied that we assume financial conditions can change rapidly,
and that we are looking for a more reactive proxy. Precisely to avoid
imposing strong assumptions on the nature of the process for finan-
cial conditions, we have adopted a criterion that only assumes that
(i) all the indexes we study provide some information about financial
conditions, and (ii) none of the indexes is likely to contain uniquely
accurate information about financial conditions.
The results in table 15 show (in bold) that the first principal
component of the St. Louis Fed, Bloomberg, Chicago Fed, and Citi
indexes has the lowest average squared deviations in all columns
(A)–(E): hence we consider such combination our composite FCI
(CFCI). Figure 4 highlights that the CFCI follows the general
pattern of the individual FCIs, but its volatility exhibits different
regimes depending on whether financial conditions are loose or tight.
The three graphs in figure 4 show the CFCI against three alter-
native proxies for financial conditions: STLFSI, which is the best-
performing individual FCI; the first principal component of STLFSI
and of the index with the lowest correlation with STLFSI (MS FCI);
and the implied volatility index VIX, which is one of the variables
underlying many FCIs. The CFCI tracks STLFSI closely, although
the latter is less volatile in the years following the bull market of the
late 1990s. The first principal component of STLFSI and of MS FCI
is more volatile than the CFCI, especially in the earlier part of the
sample, and it points to much more improved conditions than the
CFCI in early 2008, just before the crisis gained full traction.
A comparison of VIX and the CFCI shows that the two track
each other quite well, with the exception of the period between mid-
2007 and late 2008, when VIX remains stable, and the CFCI shows
a largely steady deterioration in financial conditions. In addition,
the CFCI points to loose financial conditions in the second half of
the 1990s until late 1998, while, over the same period, VIX points
to slowly deteriorating conditions starting in 1995. In figure 5, we
plot the twenty-four-month exponentially weighted rolling correla-
tion between VIX changes and changes in the CFCI, where obser-
vations are weighted so that the weight decays by 50 percent every
twelve months (see figure 5 for details). The correlation is initially
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Figure 4. The Composite FCI and Other Proxies of
Financial Conditions
Notes: Each of the three graphs shows the composite FCI (CFCI, solid line)
against one of three alternative proxies for financial conditions: the STLFSI (top
graph), which is the individual FCI that best summarizes the information in the
remaining FCIs (see table 14); the first principal component of the STLFSI and of
the index that is least correlated with the STLFSI (the MS FCI—middle graph);
and the implied volatility index VIX (bottom graph). VIX data are from the
Chicago Board Options Exchange.
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Figure 5. Exponentially Weighted Correlation between
VIX Changes and Changes in the Composite FCI
Notes: The graph shows exponentially weighted correlation (dotted line) between
monthly changes in the volatility index VIX and monthly changes in the com-
posite FCI, together with the VIX index, which is standardized for scale reasons
(dashed line), and the composite FCI (CFCI, solid line). The correlation is cal-
culated on the basis of a twenty-four-month rolling window, where the weights
decay by 50 percent every twelve months. Specifically, the weights assigned to
observations {t − i}23i=0 are given by 10.75 · α · (1 − α)i, where α = 1 − e
−ln(4)
24 .
low, but it jumps to about 80 percent with the Russian default in
August 1998. With the exception of two relatively short periods in
late 2000 and 2005/06, it stays mostly above 50 percent, and it has
been around 80–90 percent since the events of the late summer of
2008.
4. Conclusion
We provide an assessment of the one-month-ahead and one-quarter-
ahead predictive power that a selection of financial conditions
indexes (FCIs) have for returns on a broad equity index and a set
of equity industry portfolios and for innovations to log-changes in
macroeconomic variables. Our analysis is based on local-to-unity
asymptotics, which allows for accurate statistical inference in the
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presence of persistent predictors. We find that the evidence for pre-
dictive power at the horizons we consider is generally weak, unless
the financial crisis is included. Further, part of the predictive power
is driven by the effects of non-synchronous trading and, potentially,
data mining. We also study the relation between the FCIs and
consumer credit, mortgage credit, and the issuance of commercial
mortgage-backed securities, and find only limited evidence that the
FCIs Granger-cause these variables. Based on these results, we con-
clude that FCIs are better used as aggregate indicators of current
financial conditions.
We also observe that, even in the months leading to the 2008
financial crisis, different FCIs can provide conflicting assessments of
financial conditions. We suggest a procedure for combining the vari-
ous FCIs into a single proxy, which can help reduce the uncertainty
facing policymakers when monitoring financial conditions. Our pro-
cedure builds on the modest assumptions that all the FCIs we study
provide some information about financial conditions, yet no index
contains uniquely accurate information.
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